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The study aims to compare and 
contrast the position of four countries 
(The US, UK, Australia, and 
Malaysia) regarding informed 
consent, particularly on the subject of 
disclosure of information with 
Indonesia. Other than that, the legal 
issues to be studied were the 
implications brought upon the 
healthcare and judicial system in the 
respective countries as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of each 
test propounded. It was found that 
previously the welfare of the patient in 
regards to their right to receive 
information (especially risks) 
regarding their medical treatment was 
only up to the discretion of the medical 
practitioner and other members of the 
medical profession, which eliminates 
liability against a negligent doctor if it 
was found that other members of the 
medical community would have done 
the same as him. It was not until the 
case of Rogers v Whitaker that the 
spectrum widened and allowed the 
courts to determine that whatever that 
should be disclosed to the patient must 
be something that the patient attaches 
significant risk to, this is then named 
the “Prudent Patient Test”, used by 
most countries in this study. The 
study finds that as an implication, 
most countries have departed from the 
previous paternalistic approach by 
doctors and as an advantage, encouraged individualism and the 
reduction of the patients as passive recipients in their own health care. 
Since most of the comparative countries are similar in application, it 
was found that the medical law envisioned and enforced in the 
respective countries was quite different compared to the civil legal 
system in Indonesia. Other than that, as a country that is highly 
ingrained with Islamic values of life, the perspective of human rights 
and individualism in Indonesia is distinct with most of the other 
countries studied. 
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1.  Introduction  
The maxim of volenti non fit injuria means that no 
wrong is done to those who consent. Making choices and 
having the freedom to do so is a basic human right and 
should be available to anyone in any circumstance. In the 
context of medical treatment, a doctor must obtain legally 
valid consent from patients of sound mind. According to 
the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & 
Thesaurus, consent literally means permission to do 
something, acceptance, or approval. Provision 1 of the 
Consent Guidelines of the Malaysian Medical Council 
(MMC) 2013 provides consent to mean “voluntary 
acquiescence by a person to the proposal of another; the act 
or result of reaching an accord; a concurrence of minds; 
actual willingness that an act or an infringement of an 
interest shall occur”.  In addition, Provision 2 of the consent 
guidelines states that generally no procedure, surgery, 
treatment or examination may be undertaken on a patient 
without the patient’s consent. This is due to the fact that in 
the perspective of common law, non-consensual touching 
of another person may amount to battery, which was the 
rule during the early onset development of the doctrine of    
14 
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Informed consent. It was considered that if 
the patient was not properly informed of the 
nature, purpose, risks, and alternatives of the 
proposed medical treatment, it can be said 
that the consent was thus vitiated and the 
subsequent performance of the medical 
procedure became a battery. Similarly, under 
Indonesian law, the absence of informed 
consent may trigger either civil or criminal 
action against the doctor. Civil action can be 
based on Article 1365 of the Civil Code 
(governing tort), while criminal action can be 
based on Article 351 of the Penal Code 
(governing maltreatment). Therefore, this 
gives rise to the fact that the issue of 
informed consent is not just an ethical 
principle, but also a legal one. 
For the patient to give consent, they 
need to be informed prior to medical 
treatment about the nature of their 
proceedings. This means that doctors are 
required to provide their patients with 
sufficient information so that the patients 
could assent to or withhold consent from a 
proffered medical treatment. This coincides 
with two human rights issues under the 
doctrine of informed consent, which is a 
patient’s right to information, and a patient’s 
right to self-determination which supports 
the logical reasoning to let the patient make 
the decision on whether or not to undergo the 
proposed treatment. Moreover, it also 
conforms with a patient’s right to privacy 
because lack of consent makes medical 
intervention a violation of the patient’s 
privacy.  
The case of Chatterton v Gerson1  where 
Bristow J held “once the parties are informed 
in broad terms of the nature of the procedure 
which is intended, and gives her consent, that 
consent is real…” highlights this. Some courts 
have also held that this knowledge of certain 
risks could be material to understanding of 
the basic nature and character of an operation 
                                                             
1 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257  
and that failure to disclose them would 
vitiate consent and could amount to battery.2  
The two early major landmark cases 
involved in the doctrine of informed consent 
are the American Canterbury v Spence3  and 
the British Sidaway v. Governors of Bethlem 
Royal Hospital. 4  The two cases were on 
opposite ends of the doctor-patient spectrum, 
with Canterbury being patient-oriented and 
Sidaway leaning more towards the doctors. 
This is due to a paradigm shift in medical 
practice from medical paternalism, which is 
based on the idea that a doctor knows what is 
best for his patient, in contrast to the idea that 
the patient knows his own best interest and 
therefore must be involved in the decision-
making process relating to medical 
treatment. 5  It was not until the Australian 
High Court case of Rogers v Whitaker6  that 
effectively endorsed the patient-oriented 
"American" rule of liability in Canterbury that 
presented Australia with the strongest and 
most patient-oriented doctrine of informed 
consent among the common law 
jurisdictions.7   However, the case still did not 
resolve a significant issue surrounding 
informed consent: who decides how much 
information must be provided to patients—
the judge or the jury and what constitutes 
relevant evidence on the issue of what a 
physician should have disclosed to a patient. 
 
2.  Method 
This is a descriptive and comparative 
study. The scope of study included related 
laws, case laws, and statutory provisions 
concerning informed consent and disclosure 
                                                             
2 Kelly v. Hazlett (1976) 15 O.R. (2d) 290, 310 (C.A.). 
3 Canterbury v. Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (1972) (D.C. 
Cir.). 
4 Sidaway v. Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital 
[1985] A.C. 871 (H.L.). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 
7 Chalmers, Don, and Robert Schwartz. 1993. 
"Rogers V Whitaker and Informed Consent In 
Australia: A Fair Dinkum Duty Of Disclosure". 
Medical Law Review 1 (2): 139-159. 
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in countries such as the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia. Data was gathered 
from systematic internet research, and library 
resources. 
 
3. Analysis and Results  
3.1.  United States 
In the United States (henceforth re-
ferred to as the US), the doctrine of in-
formed consent loosely started in 1914 
with the case of Schloendorff v. Society of 
New York Hospital8 where a patient named 
Mary Schloendorff had been subjected to 
surgery against her expressed wishes and 
protests. She successfully sued the sur-
geon and the hospital. Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo’s quote in the case is said to be 
the root of the principle of autonomy: 
‘every human being of adult years and 
sound mind shall have the right to de-
termine what shall be done with his own 
body ....’ However, the term ‘informed 
consent’ was not used until much later in 
the case of Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr Uni-
versity Board of Trustees9. The plaintiff, 
Martin Salgo had undergone an aortog-
raphy, a minimally invasive procedure of 
an x-ray examination of the body's main 
artery. After waking up paralysed, he re-
alised he had never been informed that 
such a risk existed. It was held that the 
physician would be considered violating 
his duty and subjecting himself to liabil-
ity if he withholds any facts which are 
necessary to form the basis of an intelli-
gent consent by the patient to the pro-
posed treatment. The case however then 
backtracks by providing that even though 
a full disclosure of facts is necessary to 
                                                             
8Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital 105 
N.E. 92, 211 N.Y. 125 
9 Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr University Board of 
Trustees 154 Cal. App. 2d 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)  
obtain an informed consent, the issue of 
how much information to be given to the 
patients was up for debate by consulting 
fellow doctors.  
However, the principle that can be 
derived from Salgo is then brought up 
and challenged in the landmark case of 
Canterbury v Spence10. In the case, the 
plaintiff Jerry Canterbury was partially 
paralyzed after thoracic spine surgery. 
His claim that he had not been informed 
that such a risk existed was confirmed in 
testimony by his surgeon. In the decision, 
the Court had held that it is an estab-
lished rule that a treatment without au-
thorization (i.e consent) from the patient 
would amount to a tort and that a consent 
is not complete unless the physician first 
explains the options and risks of the 
treatment for the patient’s education. Fur-
thermore, in regards to the notion that the 
issue of the extent of the information to 
be divulged to the patient is no more than 
what other reasonable practitioners 
would divulge, the court held that: 
“Respect for the patient’s right of self-
determination on particular therapy 
demands a standard set by law for 
physicians rather than one which 
physicians may or may not impose 
upon themselves.” 
What this means is that previously 
the standard of duty that was judged by 
the medical profession is now ultimately 
to be decided by the courts. Moreover, it 
was also held that the doctor must dis-
close all “material” risks inherent in a 
proposed treatment. To determine what 
constitutes a material risk, the case intro-
duced a “prudent patient” test. It was re-
garded that “[a] risk is material when a 
reasonable person, in what the physician 
                                                             
10 Canterbury v. Spence 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 
1972)  
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knows or should know to be the patient’s 
position, would be likely to attach signifi-
cance to the risk or cluster of risks in de-
termining whether or not to forego the 
proposed therapy.”11   
  Other than that, Canterbury also 
presents the defence of therapeutic privi-
lege, which is an exception that allows 
the doctor to withhold information from 
his patient concerning risks of proposed 
treatment if it can be established by 
means of medical evidence that disclo-
sure of this information would pose a se-
rious threat of psychological harm to the 
patient. The reason for this is to alleviate 
more harm that could befall the patient.   
In certain academic discussions, it 
was proposed that the implication of Can-
terbury is that in order for a patient suc-
cessfully to argue that a physician is lia-
ble in negligence for failure to disclose 
information to the patient, the patient 
must also show that the breach of the du-
ty by the physician actually (and proxi-
mately) caused some damage to the pa-
tient, which brings rise to the test of cau-
sation normally found as an element in 
negligence cases.  
In Canterbury the court had faced 
the question of whether the causation test 
should be the subjective standard applied 
in all other negligence actions (would this 
patient have foregone this procedure if 
she were provided with the withheld in-
formation?) or an objective one (would a 
reasonable patient have foregone this pro-
cedure if she were provided with the 
withheld information?). Looking at the 
fact that in hindsight every person in-
jured during a medical procedure would 
testify that she would have foregone the 
procedure if only she had access to what-
                                                             
11 Ibid. 
ever information was withheld, the court 
concluded that the objective rule would 
eliminate one of the most substantial bar-
riers in medico-legal litigation, which is 
obtaining expert witness testimony and 
deciding between two conflicting ones.12 
Therefore the objective test had eliminat-
ed the possibility of informed consent ac-
tions arising out of most medical proce-
dures.  
An example of this is that no rea-
sonable person with cataracts would 
choose to not undergo a cataract surgery 
if fully informed about the risks, benefits, 
and alternatives of the surgery because 
the choice to not undergo the treatment 
simply would not be a reasonable one. 
Thus, a cataract surgery cannot give rise 
to a negligence-based informed consent 
action (if the objective rule is applied), no 
matter what that person is (or is not) told 
about the procedure, because the patient 
will not be able to show that a reasonable 
person would have foregone the surgery 
under any circumstances, with all the in-
formation. Therefore, only truly elective 
procedures can give rise to a successful 
action. This means that although Canter-
bury is patient-oriented by being broad in 
defining its rule of duty, the success rate 
of the patient has been somewhat dimin-
ished with its rule of causation. 
All in all, even though the Canter-
bury approach seems to be a satisfactory 
patient-oriented precedent, however only 
about half of the American jurisdictions 
have actually accepted it; the other half 
still apply the doctor-oriented test. With 
that being said, it can be seen how more 
                                                             
12 Jahn Kassim, Puteri Nemie. 2007. Law And Ethics 
Relating To Medical Profession. Petaling Jaya, 
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advantageous the approach of Canterbury 
as compared to Salgo in terms of the suc-
cess rate for the plaintiff/patient and in 
refining the doctor-patient relationship. 
Although there are many variations on 
this patient-oriented rule such as stated 
above, most apply the combination of the 
two subjective and objective tests which 
formed the basis of the test in Canterbury 
itself. Other than that, the existence of 
Canterbury also introduced the defence of 
therapeutic privilege in which the 
amount of disclosure of facts is not just a 
matter of medical judgment but also con-
tingent upon the psychological state of 
the patient and whether the information 
will affect it.  
3.2.  United Kingdom   
In England (henceforth referred to 
as the UK), the doctrine of informed con-
sent used to have no place within English 
law.13 It is believed that doctors need only 
to tell their patients what other doctors 
think, and the standard is to be based on 
medical judgment as well. However, in 
contrast to the US, what constitutes a 
“material risk” is not determined by the 
“prudent patient” test, but the “prudent 
doctor” test, which means that the mate-
rial risk could only be assessed as materi-
al according to other doctors’ opinions. 
This first materialised in the case of Sida-
way v Board Governors of Bethlem etc14. The 
plaintiff had undergone an operation on 
her spine designed to relieve her neck, 
shoulder, and arm pain. The operation 
had carried an inherent and material risk 
of damage to the spinal column and 
nerve roots which was assessed at be-
tween 1 and 2%. The risk had material-
ised, leaving the plaintiff severely disa-
                                                             
13 Ibid 
14Sidaway v Board Governors of Bethlem etc [1985] 
AC 871   
bled. She had sued in negligence, claim-
ing that the surgeon had failed to disclose 
or explain to her the risks involved in the 
operation. The majority of the court held 
that the question on whether an omission 
to warn a patient of inherent risks of pro-
posed treatment constituted a breach of a 
doctor’s duty of care was to be deter-
mined by applying the Bolam principle.  
In spite of the differing opinions 
between the members of the majority re-
garding the extent of application of the 
Bolam principle, it was still held that the 
legal standard of disclosure was still 
principally judged and governed by what 
was a commonly accepted practice by the 
medical professionals. This was due to 
the notion that although a patient may 
make an unbalanced judgment if he is 
deprived of information, he may also 
make an unbalanced judgment if he is 
provided with too much information and 
is made aware of possibilities which he is 
not capable of assessing because of his 
lack of medical training. Thus, the pru-
dent doctor test was upheld.  
In spite of that, many had called 
into question the appropriateness of the 
decision and the open-ended questions it 
had raised, especially in the legal fraterni-
ty.15 However, in 2015, the principle in 
Sidaway was (to some, finally) overruled 
and the UK Law of Consent finally in-
cluded the prudent patient test in the case 
of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board16. In this case, the pregnant appel-
lant had claimed that she should have 
been given advice about the risk of 
shoulder dystocia which would be in-
volved in vaginal birth and also advice 
                                                             
15Ian Kennedy, ‘The Patient on the Clapham 
Omnibus’ (1984) 47 Med L Rev 454 
16Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] 
UKSC 1 
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pertaining to alternative means of deliv-
ery by caesarean section as she was dia-
betic. The risk was about 9-10%. During 
the vaginal birth, the risk materialized, 
and her son was born with severe disabil-
ities. The appellant had claimed that had 
she been told of the risk, she would have 
opted for a caesarean section. Although 
the appellant had lost in the Court of Ses-
sions, the outcome in the Supreme Court 
had represented one of the rare occasions 
in which a patient had succeeded in a 
negligence case at appellate court level.  
The justification given by the phy-
sician in withholding the information 
from her was essentially the risks were 
very small and if mentioned, would 
merely serve to confuse the patient and 
open a floodgate of caesarean-only birth 
requests from mothers which do not 
overall serve the interests of the mother. 
This is also reminiscent of the paternal-
istic ‘doctor knows best’ culture that has 
been a dominant feature in English medi-
cal law. Heywood in his article17 high-
lighted that the information regarding the 
risk in Montgomery was “so crucial to the 
mindset of the mother in determining the 
trajectory of her pregnancy that the fail-
ure to disclose it effectively meant that 
she was never afforded the opportunity 
to exercise her basic right of patient 
choice.” 
The presiding judges Lords Kerr 
and Reed had held that a doctor is under 
a duty to take reasonable care to ensure 
that the patient is aware of any material 
risks involved in any recommended 
treatment, and of any reasonable alterna-
tive or variant treatments. Much like in 
the cases of Canterbury and Rogers, the 
                                                             
17 Heywood, Rob. 2015. "R.I.P Sidaway: Patient 
Oriented Disclosure - A Standard Worth Waiting 
For?". Medical Law Review 23 (3): 455-466. 
test of materiality declared by the judges 
was defined as whether, in the circum-
stances of a case, a reasonable person in 
the patient’s position would be likely to 
attach significance to the risk, or the doc-
tor is or should be reasonably be aware 
that the particular patient would be likely 
to attach significance to it. However, it 
was also subjected to therapeutic privi-
lege (which entitles a doctor to withhold 
information from a patient if it is reason-
ably considered that the disclosure would 
be seriously detrimental to the patient’s 
health.). It was also established from this 
case that patients are no longer passive 
recipients in medical care.   
The significance of Montgomery 
was not just in its overruling of Sidaway 
but also in its endorsement of the framing 
of the duty of disclosure in the Australian 
case of Rogers v Whitaker of which the 
facts will be discussed further in this 
study. By endorsing the Rogers approach, 
the Lords concurred that the test of mate-
riality would no longer be restricted to 
what the reasonable person in the pa-
tient’s position would consider significant 
but is now extended to include the notion 
that a risk would also be material if the 
doctor is or should be reasonably be 
aware that the particular patient would be 
likely to attach significance to it. The rea-
son that this is significant is because it 
acknowledges the differing perspectives 
of each patient, not as just a reasonable 
man but a reasonable man in the patient’s 
position. As per in Montgomery, the ‘cir-
cumstances of each individual patient 
may affect their attitude towards a pro-
posed form of treatment…’. 
The implications of the principle 
laid out in Montgomery can be said to be 
disadvantageous to some. For instance, 
opponents of the particular patient stand-
ard might argue that under the same 
19 
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limb, smaller risks that have very low 
percentages should then also be disclosed 
which means that the focus would then 
be moved away from the likeliness of oc-
currence to just the severity of the materi-
alised risk. 
In conclusion, the key difference 
between both Sidaway and Montgomery 
which has laid out the basis of the duty of 
disclosure is that in Montgomery, the duty 
of the doctor has been strengthened and 
substantiated and in doing so has in-
creased the protection that the law offers 
to the patient’s right to receive appropri-
ate and adequate information prior to any 
medical treatment or procedures. This 
new test recognises that the relationship 
between doctor and patient has evolved 
such that they may have a dialogue over 
the patient’s options, and the doctor 
should facilitate the patient’s understand-
ing. As mentioned by Lord Kerr and Lord 
Reid in Montgomery, ‘the doctor’s duty of 
care takes its precise content from the 
needs, concerns, and circumstances of the 
individual patients,’ therefore the rights 
of a patient should not just be acknowl-
edged, but also prioritised, as they are no 
longer passive recipients in the care of the 
medical profession.  
3.3. Australia  
In Australia, the landmark case to 
be discussed on the issue of informed 
consent and disclosure is the case of Rog-
ers v Whitaker18. In this case, the patient, 
Ms Whitaker, decided to have elective 
surgery on her right eye, which was vi-
sion-impaired from an accident that oc-
curred during her youth. Despite that, 
she had led a “substantially normal life”, 
working, marrying and raising children. 
                                                             
18Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; 175 CLR 479; 
23 NSWLR 600; 109 ALR 625; (1991) Aust Torts 
Reports 81–113  
However, on having a check-up, surgery 
was recommended. After the surgery, 
certain complications had developed in 
the right eye, spreading to the left eye 
and resulting in almost total blindness. 
This is known as “sympathetic ophthal-
mia,” and is a recognized risk of eye sur-
gery. At no stage was Ms Whitaker 
warned of the probability of this occur-
ring. Ms Whitaker sued in negligence on 
several grounds, including failure of the 
defendant, Dr Rogers to warn her of the 
risk of sympathetic ophthalmia, perform-
ing an ill-advised operation, failure to fol-
low up missed appointments, and failure 
to enucleate the right eye following de-
velopment of symptoms of sympathetic 
ophthalmia in the left eye.   
Rogers had argued that the issue 
should be resolved by application of the 
Bolam Principle as applied in the UK and 
described in Sidaway. However, the ma-
jority High Court judges refused to apply 
the Bolam test. In their majority judge-
ment Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, 
Toohey and McHugh JJ rejected this prin-
ciple, noting that in relation to standard 
of care:  
“In Australia, it has been accepted 
that the standard of care to be ob-
served by a person with some special 
skill or competence is that of the ordi-
nary skilled person exercising and 
professing to have that special skill…  
But, that standard is not determined 
solely or even primarily by reference 
to the practice followed or supported 
by a responsible body of opinion in 
the relevant profession or trade.”  
The main reasons for the rejection 
of the Bolam principle was because firstly, 
the Law Lords were divided themselves 
about the way the Bolam test should be 
applied to evaluate the provision of med-
ical advice. Secondly, the Bolam test "has 
20 
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invariably been applied in English 
courts", but has not been so well accepted 
in Australia and lastly, it did not attach 
any significance to the patients' questions 
to their physicians, as under the British 
rule Mr Rogers would not have had to 
answer her questions honestly if other 
members of the ophthalmic surgeon 
brotherhood would not have done so. 
Another point that could be made 
is that their Lordships had also felt that 
the decision in Sidaway was confusing 
and discordant, therefore they concluded 
that the Bolam test cannot be used to de-
termine the scope of the doctor’s duty of 
disclosure because there was a difference 
between diagnosis and treatment and the 
provision of advice and information. This 
is because in diagnosis and treatment, the 
patient’s role is insignificant as they 
would only be required to narrate symp-
toms and relevant history of their illness 
to the doctor. However, in the provision 
of information, it merely involves com-
munication skills, and they are not exclu-
sive to only medical practitioners. There-
fore, the High Court concluded that the 
scope of a doctor’s duty of disclosure is 
“…to warn a patient of material risks in-
herent in the proposed treatment; a risk is 
material if, in the circumstances of a par-
ticular case, a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position, if warned of the risk, 
would be likely to attach significance to 
it…”. Thus, it can be seen from this sole 
landmark case that the courts in Australia 
have rightfully categorised a doctor’s du-
ty into three: duty to diagnose, duty to 
warn, and duty to treat. However, there 
was still some confusion as to the applica-
tion of the principle in Rogers v Whitaker 
as to whether it was only restricted to 
cases of negligence in duty to disclose. 
The case Naxakis v Western General Hospi-
tal19 it was held by Gaudron J that the 
standard of care is not to be decided by 
the Bolam principle and that in Australia, 
the Bolam test is to be rejected for duty to 
treat, diagnose, and advise. 
Despite the High Court’s attempt 
to distinguish its approach from that tak-
en by the American courts by mentioning 
the unsatisfactory use of the language in 
the cases and in particular from the ap-
proach in Canterbury, the legal duty de-
scribed in Rogers is virtually identical to 
the patient-disclosure-oriented rule an-
nounced in Canterbury.20 In Rogers, the 
law recognises that a doctor has a duty to 
warn the patient of a material risk inher-
ent in the proposed treatment. A risk is 
material if, in the circumstances of the 
particular case, a reasonable person in the 
patient's position, if warned of the risk, 
would be likely to attach significance to it 
or if the medical practitioner is or should 
reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient, if warned of the risk, would be 
likely to attach significance to it. In Can-
terbury, it is mentioned that a risk is thus 
material when a reasonable person, in 
what the physician knows or should 
know to be the patient's position, would 
be likely to attach significance to the risk 
or cluster of risks in deciding whether or 
not to forego the proposed therapy. It is 
almost verbatim.  
Chalmers and Schwaltz (1993) 
opined that the principle derived from 
Rogers was unstable and leaves open to a 
number of questions as to its applicability 
as seen from the American jurisdictions 
that have adopted the same principle. 
That being said, the case has brought up-
on a number of implications. It has been 
                                                             
19 Naxakis v Western General Hospital [1993] 73 
ALJR 782 
20 Ibid. n 7 
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established that the duty of care is to be 
defined as a matter of law, and not by the 
professional peers of the defendant. 
However, questions arise as to how the 
courts are go about in making the defini-
tion and determining whether a duty has 
been breached in any particular case as 
well as the function of the judges. The 
High Court mentions that it will adopt 
the principle in the case of F v R21  that 
what must be disclosed by the physician 
in any particular case "depends upon a 
complex of factors: the nature of the mat-
ter to be disclosed; the nature of the 
treatment; the desire of the patient for in-
formation; the temperament and health of 
the patient; and the general surrounding 
circumstances” but how these factors are 
to be weighed is an issue that the courts 
will find themselves facing.  
Next, an implication is that there is 
also an uncertainty over the extent of the 
duty to disclose - is a physician liable for 
failure to provide information even when 
a patient decides against a proposed 
treatment, or even when there is no 
treatment that has been proposed? An 
example is the American case of Truman v 
Thomas22 where a physician was found 
negligent for failing to explain to an pen-
niless patient the risk that was a conse-
quence of deciding not to have a pap 
smear and who subsequently died of a 
cancer that would have been discovered 
earlier had she undergone this recom-
mended procedure. An affirmative an-
swer would bring about preventive med-
icine and attention to health maintenance 
by making those physicians who negli-
gently fail to provide their patients with 
information necessary to keep themselves 
healthy liable for their patients' subse-
                                                             
21 F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189 
22 Truman v Thomas (1980) 611 P. 2d 902 (Cal. Sup. 
Ct.). 
quent illnesses and injuries. Whether this 
is advantageous or not to the medical 
profession community is still up for de-
bate.  
On the issue of causation, although 
it was raised, was not a focal point in Rog-
ers. Mr Rogers had argued that Ms Whit-
aker would have still undergone the pro-
cedure even if she were told that there 
was a one in 14,000 chance of sympathetic 
ophthalmia, while Ms Whitaker testified 
that "if someone had said one in a million 
chance, there would be no operation". 
However, Mr Rogers' counsel made no 
submission on that issue and was thus 
deemed to have waived the issue in the 
High Court. Nevertheless, both the trial 
court and the Court of Appeal had ap-
plied the subjective causation test that 
was ordinarily applied in tort cases as it 
was also the standard applied by the 
South Australia Supreme Court in F v R 
of which the judges had based their opin-
ion for the Rogers decision. In the Court 
of Appeal Mahoney J.A. did not consider 
the nature of whether the test was subjec-
tive or objective, but in addressing the 
issue of causation, he found that although 
the failure to warn did not physically 
cause the sympathetic ophthalmia of the 
defendant, it was Mr Rogers’ breach of 
duty to give sound advice when asked 
questions that was the cause of the plain-
tiff’s decision to undergo the surgery, 
which ultimately caused the harm. As 
held by Handley J.A, the causative link 
provided in this case was the reliance Ms 
Whitaker had placed on the advice of Mr 
Rogers. While the Justice does not offi-
cially mention that the use of the subjec-
tive standard for causation was used, it 
was suggested that he assumed the test 
would be the subjective one as per usual-
ly used in negligence cases. This signifies 
that moving forward, if the High Court 
22 
Vol. 2 No.1 / December 2019 
 
 
decides to apply the subjective causation 
principle usually applied in negligence 
cases in regards to informed consent ac-
tions, Australian law would be consid-
ered more in favour of the plaintiffs than 
most other jurisdictions. Chalmers and 
Schwaltz (1993) also suggests that the ab-
sence of contingent fees in tort litigation, 
the existence of a high quality and uni-
versally accessible health care system, 
and the presence of a strong social safety 
net in Australia would not result in a bar-
rage of informed consent cases.  
In conclusion, Australia seems to 
have taken a far-right approach in terms 
of the duty to disclose in regards to in-
formed consent. The decision of the High 
Court of Australia in Rogers to reject the 
English doctor-oriented test in Sidaway 
(and consequently, the Bolam principle) 
was not the first of its kind as can be seen 
in cases Goode v. Nash23; Albrighton v. Roy-
al Prince Alfred Hospital24; and F. v. R25. 
Even though the judges had refused to 
use the language and justification in the 
formative American case of Canterbury, 
the principle adopted by the High Court 
was virtually identical, both applying the 
patient-oriented approach. Although 
leaving a few unanswered questions, the 
case of Rogers is instrumental in ensuring 
that physicians have a duty to disclose 
information to their patients and that this 
duty is independent of the duty to diag-
nose and treat. 
3.4. Malaysia   
In Malaysia the Bolam principle has 
been routinely applied by the courts to 
medical negligence cases in determining 
the physician’s standard of care. Such 
                                                             
23 Goode v Nash (1979) 21 S.A.S.R. 419 
24 Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital (1980) 2 
N.S.W.LR. 542 
25 Ibid. n 21 
cases include Liew Sin Kiong v Dr Sharon 
M Paulraj26 and Dato Dr. V. Thuraisingam 
v Sanmarkan A/L Ganapathy27 wherein the 
Justice had stated that if the Bolam test 
was not used, then the law would have 
intervened too much in the field of medi-
cal negligence, which would lead to the 
practice of defensive medicine, which is 
when a doctor is too afraid of being sued 
for wrongly diagnosing a patient. Never-
theless, the judge in Kamalam a/p & Ors v 
Eastern Plantation Agency & Anor28 had 
stated that he was not bound by the Bolam 
principle. Similarly, in Hong Chuan Lay v 
Dr Eddie Soo Fook Mun29 Justice James 
Foong departed from the Bolam test and 
followed the approach adopted in Rogers 
v Whitaker and even appraised the Aus-
tralian High Court judges for their clarity, 
conciseness and comprehensibility in ex-
plaining the distinction between the 
Bolam test and the new approach.   
Fifty years after Bolam, the Federal 
Court of Malaysia in the case of Foo Fio 
Na v Dr Soo Fook Mun & Anor30 changed 
the scene for Malaysia’s medico-legal 
community. The patient in this case suf-
fered closed dislocation of her spine and 
had to undergo a surgery where the dis-
located vertebrae were moved to their 
normal positions and secured by bone 
grafting and insertion of a loop of wire. 
The wire loop was found to cause total 
paralysis of the patient by pressing on the 
spinal cord. Although the patient signed 
a general consent form during admission, 
the patient claimed that she was not in-
formed of the risk of paralysis from the 
particular surgery. The court found that 
                                                             
26 [1996] 2 AMR 1403 
27 [2012] 3 MLJ 817 
28 [1996] 4 MLJ 674 
29 [1998] 5 CLJ 251 
30 [1999] 6 MLJ 738 
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the doctor was negligent in failing to in-
form her of the risk. 
The court also decided that the Bo-
lam principle should no longer be applied 
to a doctor’s duty to disclose risks. The 
test in Rogers v Whitaker, according to the 
judge would be “a more appropriate and 
a viable test of this millennium.” It was 
also mentioned in the Federal Court that 
the Bolam test “has no relevance to the 
duty and standard of care of a medical 
practitioner in providing advice to a pa-
tient on the inherent material risks of the 
proposed treatment. The practitioner is 
duty bound by law to inform his patient 
who is capable of understanding and ap-
preciating such information of the risks 
involved in any proposed treatment so as 
to enable the patient to make an election 
of whether to proceed with the proposed 
treatment with knowledge of the risks 
involved or decline to be subjected to 
such treatment.” This goes to show that 
even a general consent form is meaning-
less if the patient is not informed of rele-
vant risks of the procedure and that 
whether a particular information is rele-
vant also depends on the point of view of 
the patient, and not necessarily the opin-
ions of the doctors.  
Thus, it can be said that there are 
two standards of care in Malaysia: in de-
termining cases of duty to diagnose and 
treat, the previously mentioned Bolam test 
which was more doctor-oriented; and in 
cases regarding duty to disclose risks the 
principles underlined in Rogers v Whitaker 
would be used and would assessed in 
conjunction with the rule of law in Can-
terbury when it came to applying the test 
of materiality. The difference in applica-
tion of these standards of care can be seen 
in more recent cases such as Zulhasnimar 
bt Hasan Basri & Anor v Dr Kuppu Veluma-
ni P & Ors31. Although the decision was 
not in the plaintiff’s favour, a clear dis-
tinction was brought about regarding the 
two standards of care that could be found 
in Malaysia, in regards to duty to diag-
nose and treat on the one hand and the 
duty to advise of risks on the other. Raus 
Sharif CJ held that:  
“different consideration ought to 
apply to the duty to advise of risks 
as opposed to diagnosis and treat-
ment. As decided by the Australian 
High Court in Rogers and followed 
by this Court in Foo Fio Na, it is 
now the courts’ (rather than a body 
of respected medical practitioners) 
which will decide whether a patient 
has been properly advised of the 
risks associated with a proposed 
treatment. The courts would no 
longer look to what a body of re-
spectable members of the medical 
profession would do as the yardstick 
to govern the standard of care ex-
pected in respect of the duty to ad-
vise.” 
The presence of two standards of 
care in Malaysia and the use of two dif-
ferent tests brought upon various reper-
cussions to the Malaysian healthcare sys-
tem. For instance, the concept of patient 
autonomy triumphing over medical pa-
ternalism. With increasing public aware-
ness in regards to patient autonomy and 
consumer rights, the medical profession 
needs to be ready to accept patients as no 
longer passive recipients in medical care.  
In short, in my own personal opin-
ion, there should not be a question as to 
which test is better as each test has been 
categorised into a specialised area which 
brings about its relativity when deciding 
cases. Furthermore, it widens the scope 
                                                             
31 [2017] 5 MLJ 438 
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for Malaysian judges and to not be nar-
rowed down to only one test to decide a 
case as there are a lot of precedents that 
could help in deciding.  
3.5. Indonesia   
After careful analysis of the four 
common law countries, we now look to 
Indonesia’s position on this whole issue. 
As a country whose legal system is em-
bedded in the civil legal system, the dis-
cussion on informed consent and the duty 
of disclosure will refer mainly to statuto-
ry provisions. Nonetheless, although ju-
dicial decisions are not binding, it is still 
important to note the case of Muhidin in 
Sukabumi which was a milestone in the 
development of the Informed Consent 
doctrine. Subsequent to this case, a fatwa 
was issued and adopted concerning Ap-
proval of Medical Measures.32 The case 
involved a doctor who did not explain 
that one of the risks of eye surgery was 
that "the patient's eyes would look perfo-
rated." Muhidin sued the doctor in ques-
tion.  
In statutory provisions, the doc-
trine of informed consent in Indonesia is 
articulated in Law No. 36 of 2009 on 
Health and the Law No. 29 of 2004 on 
Medical Practice. It is also specifically 
regulated by the Health Ministerial De-
cree No. 290 of 2008 regarding Medical 
Informed Consent.33 In Article 7b of In-
donesia’s official Medical Code of Ethics 
called the Kode Etik Kedokteran Indonesia 
(KODEKI), it states that the doctor's duty 
relating to information is to provide ade-
quate and honest information to the pa-
                                                             
32 Sugiarti, Ida. 2010. "Perbandingan Hukum 
Informed Consent Indonesia Dan Amerika 
Serikat". Jurnal Ilmu Hukum UNISBA 12 (3). 
33 Moein, Harustiati A. 2018. "Informed Consent in 
Indonesia". Journal of Law, Policy And Globalization 
69: 66. 
tient about the need for the relevant med-
ical treatment and the risks it may incur. 
The scope of ‘information’ mentioned is 
cross-referenced with Section 45 (3) of the 
Medical Practice Act 2004 which com-
prises diagnosis and medical treatment, 
the aim of the proposed treatment, alter-
natives of therapy and their risks, possi-
ble risks and complications, and progno-
sis.   
  This means that doctors in Indone-
sia are bound by codified law to express-
ly disclose information to the patients, 
which is in contrast to the countries pre-
viously mentioned above who are only 
bound to disclose once they consider the 
material risk of disclosure and the excep-
tion of therapeutic privilege. However, 
Indonesian law also recognizes therapeu-
tic privilege in article 5 of the KODEKI 
which states “information should be pro-
vided in a complete and honest manner, 
unless the physician judges that the in-
formation may harm the interests or 
health of the patient or the patient refuses 
to be informed.” Additionally, Indonesia 
law also provides that one of the hospi-
tal's obligations to the patient is to pro-
vide an explanation of what the patient 
suffered and what action to take. This can 
be found in Chapter III Article 10 of the 
Kode Etik Rumah Sakit Indonesia 
(KODERSI) or the hospital code of ethics. 
The relationship between the doctor and 
the patient is mostly referred to as a busi-
ness relationship, between business ac-
tors and consumers34. As consumers, the 
patient has legal protection from possible 
negligence, and is also entitled to safety, 
security, and comfort to the service he re-
ceives. A patient also has a right to be 
heard as a consumer.  
                                                             
34 Ibid.  
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In her article, Sugiarti (2010) men-
tions that a major element in the for-
mation of informed consent or “the right 
to self- determination” which occurred in 
the US is due to the growth and progress 
of human rights as time goes on. She 
states that Indonesia, as a country with 
the most Muslims in the world, follows 
the precepts and teachings of Islam, 
which has differing perspectives with 
human rights oriented America. An ex-
ample would be when the more specific 
regulations regarding informed consent 
were regulated in the Minister of Health 
Regulation No. 585 of 1989 concerning 
Approval of Medical Measures. The regu-
lation was a doctrine imported from 
America which tends to promote indi-
vidual human rights, which was incom-
patible with the culture of the Indonesian 
people, who cannot be separated from 
ties with their families, including in mak-
ing decisions about health care. Due to 
that, a new regulation was introduced 
namely the Regulation of the Minister of 
Health of the Republic of Indonesia No. 
290 / MENKES / PER / III / 2008 con-
cerning Medical Informed Consent. The 
regulation states that consent must be 
taken after the patient has received in-
formed explanation either via oral or 
written and the explanation must at least 
include diagnosis, prognosis, the risks 
and complications, the grounds of the 
treatment, and any alternative treatments. 
The relationship between health workers 
and patients is also regulated by criminal 
law. If a medical action is carried out 
without the patient's consent, it is consid-
ered to violate article 351 of the Penal 
Code.  
In conclusion, it can be deduced 
that the laws of Indonesia pertaining to 
informed consent and the duty of disclo-
sure can be found clearly in the codified 
laws. However, it can be said that as 
compared to the previous countries, the 
application of the laws could not really be 
seen clearly as there are a lack of recorded 
cases on the subject. However, in theory, 
the healthcare system in Indonesia, like 
all the other countries mentioned before, 
puts an emphasis on the rights of a pa-
tient. It is only in its implementation that 
we can see it is strongly influenced by the 
moral philosophy of the nation, based on 
its Pancasila.  
 
 4.  Conclusion 
Overall, this paper has discussed 
and compared the positions of four coun-
tries with Indonesia on the issue of in-
formed consent with a focus on disclo-
sure. At first, the doctrine was seen as 
two ends of the spectrum: the American 
rule or the British rule. But after the 
emergence of Rogers v Whitaker and the 
Australian High Court’s persistence in 
creating their own unprecedented path-
way in the legal fraternity, the doctrine of 
informed consent has branched into a 
concept that is just as relevant today. 
With that being said, it can also be con-
cluded that even though the nature of 
each country’s legal system is different 
and the application of the law is also not 
similar, each country’s emphasis on the 
importance of the duty of disclosure by 
doctors towards patients is a step to-
wards the right path in prioritising the 
involvement of patients in not only mak-
ing decisions for their treatment, but also 
their right to receive information regard-
ing their illnesses. The doctrine has also 
ensured that a person’s rights rests with 
the courts, not with the medical profes-
sionals. The clear progress of society in 
moving away from medical paternalism 
to a more hands on participation in the 
26 
Vol. 2 No.1 / December 2019 
 
 
decision-making of their own health care 
reinforces the notion that patients are 
masters of their own destiny, not the doc-
tors. After all, the central figure of con-
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